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The United States has recently experienced two asset price bubbles: the Dot Com and the
Housing Bubbles. These bubbles had very different effects on investment and debt of
manufacturing ﬁrms. In this paper I develop a framework to understand the differential
effect of two types of rational bubbles. I distinguish between (i) Outside Bubbles, which I
deﬁne as savers purchasing and selling costless assets not attached to inputs of produc
tion and (ii) Inside Bubbles, which I deﬁne as savers buying an input of production (e.g.,
land or houses) only as a store of value. The model is an OLG economy with savers and
entrepreneurs. Savers save to consume when they are old. Entrepreneurs can borrow to
invest but they face a collateral constraint. In this environment, rational bubbles can
emerge. I show that the size of an Inside Bubble is larger. I also ﬁnd that when the
economy switches from an Outside to an Inside Bubble, manufacturing (or non housing)
investment and debt is lower, consistent with the U.S. experience. Finally, I show that even
though steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble, a social planner
would prefer an Inside Bubble when the productivity of entrepreneurs is low.1. Introduction
The United States experienced a large and sudden drop in both the stock market and house prices in the last decade.
Fig. 1 shows these drops using the S&P 500 and the Case Shiller house price indices (in real terms). There is a growing
consensus that the large drop in the stock market in 2000 was the burst of the Dot Com Bubble and the sharp fall in house
prices in 2006 was the crash of the Housing Bubble.1
The behavior of the economy was different during these two episodes. Fig. 2 represents the evolution of residential and
non residential investment in the last ﬁfteen years. Residential investment largely increased during the Housing Bubble.
However, this increase in residential investment coincided with a decline in non residential investment. A possible channel
through which the expansion of residential investment affected non residential investment is the credit supply. That is,
manufacturing ﬁrms were able to borrow relatively less during the Housing Bubble. As anecdotal evidence, Fig. 3 represents
the evolution of (detrended) liabilities of the manufacturing industry. Note that liabilities during the Housing Bubble were
relatively lower than during the Dot Com Bubble. This suggestive evidence hints to the importance of considering a model
with two bubbles.2ller (2005), Kraay and Ventura (2007) or Laibson and Mollerstrom (2009), for a discussion on these
consistent with this differential effects.
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to be stylized representations of the Housing and the Dot Com Bubbles, respectively. The goal of this paper is to provide a
framework to understand why the effects of rational bubbles depend on the type of bubble.3
I consider an overlapping generation economy with two agents: savers and entrepreneurs. Savers have an endowment
but they do not have the technology to produce output. Entrepreneurs have a production technology but they may not have
enough money to invest as much as they would like. I assume that ﬁnancial markets are imperfect (e.g., there is limited
enforcement). Given this ﬁnancial market imperfection, entrepreneurs can only borrow a fraction of the value of their
collateral (land or capital). Note that this is the same collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The only non
bubble ﬁnancial instrument available to savers are bonds backed by the collateral of entrepreneurs. In this setting, if
ﬁnancial markets were perfect, rational bubbles could not emerge. That is, the borrowing constraint is not binding and the
economy generates enough assets to fulﬁll the demand of assets (savings of savers). However, when the ﬁnancial constraint
is tight enough, the borrowing constraint binds, which limits the supply of assets. In this case, there is a shortage of assets
and rational bubbles may emerge in equilibrium.4
The main contribution of the paper is to study the differential effects of the two types of bubbles. When there is an
Outside Bubble, savers still purchase bonds, but a fraction of their savings (the bubble) is devoted to buy a costless asset,
which is not used by entrepreneurs. Savers purchase this asset only as a store of value. That is, young savers buy this asset
because they think that they will be able to sell it to the next generation of young savers when they will be old. In this sense,
the bubble is kept outside the production side of the economy. When there is an Inside Bubble, savers, instead of purchasing
this costless asset, they decide to purchase the input of production (capital). Note that savers buy capital only as a store of
value. One rationale for why savers buy capital, even though the costless asset is still available, is that they do not think that
they will be able to sell this asset to the next generation of young savers.
The paper yields three main results. The ﬁrst result is that when the economy switches from an Outside to an Inside
Bubble, both productive investment and debt decline. The intuition is that borrowing and, thus, investment of entrepreneurs
depend on the value of their collateral (capital). When the economy switches from an Outside to an Inside Bubble, it has two
effects on investment. On the one hand, the price of capital increases because there is more demand for capital, which
increases investment. On the other hand, the capital that entrepreneurs can purchase declines because they are competing
with savers, which reduces investment. I show that the second effect always dominates.
The second result is that the size of an Inside Bubble is larger. The reason is that when there is an Inside Bubble, the
amount that entrepreneurs can borrow declines (as explained above). This fall in borrowing reduces the supply of assets in
the economy. Since a bubble is deﬁned as the difference between the supply and the demand of assets, an Inside Bubble is
larger than an Outside Bubble.
The third result is that even though steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble, a social planner would
choose an Inside Bubble when productivity is low. Steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble because this
bubble is less distorting. However, a social planner also needs to take into account the welfare of the ﬁrst generation. There
is a trade off between the ﬁrst and next generations. The ﬁrst generation prefers an Inside Bubble because they have already
made their investment decisions and the bubble only increases the value of their capital. The next generations prefer an
Outside Bubble because it is less distorting. When productivity is low, the loss of next generations for having an Inside
Bubble is small and, thus, the Inside Bubble is better.
Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the steady state equilibrium without bubbles. After solving the funda
mental equilibrium, I show that rational bubbles can emerge in this model. In particular, rational bubbles can appear if the
fraction of capital that can be collateralized is sufﬁciently low. Section 3 solves the steady state equilibriumwith the Outside
and the Inside Bubbles.
Section 4 analyzes the effects of switching from the Outside to the Inside Bubble. The economy starts in the steady state
equilibrium with the Outside Bubble. However, young savers suffer an unexpected “sentiment” shock and become pessi
mistic. They do not think that they will be able to sell the costless asset to the next generation of savers. Thus, they decide to
purchase capital as a store of value (Inside Bubble), which has higher expected return than the bond. I show that investment
and debt of entrepreneurs decline. Young entrepreneurs invest less because the price of capital increases. Middle aged
entrepreneurs increase their investment at impact (if I assume that they are leveraged) but they invest less in the new
steady state. The reason is that net worth changes in two opposite directions. On the one hand, it increases because the
price of capital rises. On the other hand, it falls because when they were young they could invest less. The second effect
dominates and, thus, investment falls. Debt of entrepreneurs also declines. The reason is that the borrowing of middle aged
entrepreneurs has the same dynamics as investment.
Section 4.3 provides suggestive evidence consistent with the predictions of the model. First, I document that ﬁrms were
able to borrow relatively less during the Housing Bubble. This result holds for both the manufacturing industries and the
median sector. This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Chakraborty et al. (2014). They show that U.S. banks in
regions with a larger housing bubble reduced relatively more the amount of commercial lending. In addition, I show that3 Note that the deﬁnition of Outside and Inside Bubbles is similar to the concept of outside and inside liquidity in Farhi and Tirole (2012).
4 This is a well known result in the rational bubbles literature. See, for example, the seminal paper of Samuelson (1958) or, in a more modern setting,
Martin and Ventura (2012).
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recent housing bubble episodes have been characterized by a relative decline in both the share of non residential invest
ment and total non residential investment.
Finally, I perform welfare analysis in Section 5. First, I show that the size of the Inside Bubble is larger. The size of the
bubble is deﬁned as the difference between the demand and the supply of assets. When there is an Inside Bubble, entre
preneurs can borrow less, this reduces the supply of assets, which increases the size of the bubble. Then, I show that the
steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble. The intuition is that an Outside Bubble creates less distortions
than an Inside Bubble. Lastly, I show that a social planner would prefer an Inside Bubble over an Outside Bubble when
productivity is low. The intuition is that an Inside Bubble is inefﬁcient because some capital, instead of being used to
produce output, is purchased by savers as a store of value. When productivity is very low, this inefﬁciency is offset by the
capital gains of the ﬁrst generation of old entrepreneurs.
Related literature: This paper relates to different strands of the literature. There exists a large literature on the efﬁciency of
the market equilibrium and the role of assets without fundamental value. It includes, among others, the seminal paper of
Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965) and Cass (1972). As discussed in these papers, under certain conditions, the market
equilibrium may be inefﬁcient and assets without fundamental value, bubbles, may improve the market allocation.
The literature on rational bubbles is rich and diverse. I consider an overlapping generation economy as in the seminal
paper of Tirole (1985). However, as emphasized in Santos and Woodford (1997), the distinction between an inﬁnitely lived
agent and an overlapping generation is not crucial for the existence of rational bubbles. In my model, bubbles are possible
because of the ﬁnancial market imperfection represented by the collateral constraint.
The interaction between ﬁnancial market imperfections and bubbles was also studied in, for example, Azariadis and
Smith (1993), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Farhi and Tirole (2012), Arce and López Salido (2011), Martin and
Ventura (2012), Bao (2015) and Aoki and Nikolov (2015). The closest paper is Arce and López Salido (2011), which also have
two bubbles.5 They build a housing model and show that bubbles can appear in borrowing constrained economies. They
perform welfare analysis with two bubbles: a pure asset price and a housing bubble. The only agents in their economy are
households that can buy or rent houses (the stock of houses is ﬁxed). My model features savers and entrepreneurs. By
having entrepreneurs, I can study how different bubbles have different effects on investment and debt of ﬁrms. Another
difference is that whereas in their setup the size of the bubble does not depend on the type of bubble, I show that the size of
an Inside Bubble is always larger.
Finally, there is a large literature that studies the relationship between pure asset price bubbles (Outside Bubbles in the
model) and investment. This list includes, among others, Tirole (1985), Caballero et al. (2006), Farhi and Tirole (2012) and
Martin and Ventura (2012). Standard models of bubbles, like in Tirole (1985), ﬁnd a negative relationship between bubbles
and investment. The reason is that bubbles are possible when the economy is investing too much. Therefore, the emergence
of bubbles reduces this inefﬁciency and investment declines. New models of bubbles have tried to ﬁnd a positive
comovement. For example, in Martin and Ventura (2012) bubbles increase investment because inefﬁcient entrepreneurs buy
the bubble, which favors efﬁcient entrepreneurs. Therefore, another departure from the related literature is to show that
Inside and Outside Bubbles have different effects on investment and debt of manufacturing ﬁrms, as observed in the data.62. Model
This section develops the model and solves the fundamental steady state equilibrium. I also derive the conditions under
which rational bubbles can appear in equilibrium.
2.1. Setup
I consider an OLG economy with two types of agents: entrepreneurs and savers. Entrepreneurs are an OLG version of the
farmers in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). I assume that there are three generations of entrepreneurs: young, middle aged and
old. Each generation consists of a continuum of mass one. When they are young, they receive an endowment, which they
use to purchase capital. Middle aged and old entrepreneurs do not receive any endowment. Both the endowment and
population of entrepreneurs are constant over time. I also assume, without loss of generality, that entrepreneurs only
consume when they are old.75 Basco (2014) also studies the differential effect of two bubbles. The goal in that paper is to study how the effect of globalization on house prices
depends on the type of bubble.
6 In my paper, the Outside Bubble is just trading among savers. There exist other papers in which stock market bubbles have additional effects on the
economy. For example, Olivier (2000) assumes that asset price bubbles encourage R&D investment and it increases the growth rate of the economy.
7 In this model, entrepreneurs live for three periods. As it will become clear in the next section, the behavior of middle-aged entrepreneurs, which are
equivalent to the farmers in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), is the key of the model. They have some initial debt and capital, they produce output and make
investment choices. My results would hold if I assumed that there were only two generations of entrepreneurs and young entrepreneurs were born with
some exogenous amount of capital and debt. I choose to assume that there are three generations of entrepreneurs and young entrepreneurs only have
some endowment E.
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The life time utility of an entrepreneur born at time t is
Ut ¼ uðcE;otþ2Þ;
where E; o stands for old entrepreneur. I assume that u0ðcÞ40.
The timing of events of an entrepreneur born at time t is as follows.
1. At time t, the entrepreneur is born. She receives an endowment E and purchases capital kE;mtþ1 to produce output when
middle aged.
2. The young entrepreneur can borrow against the future value of her capital. However, I assume that there is limited
enforcement. At time tþ1, the entrepreneur should pay RtdE;yt . However, the entrepreneur could avoid repayment by
paying a fraction θ of the value of capital. The lender will anticipate this and she will lend to the borrower only up to the
point when Rtd
E;y
t rθptþ1ktþ1.8
3. At time tþ1, the entrepreneur is middle aged, she repays the debt, produces output and purchases more capital to
produce when she is old. She can also borrow and she faces the same collateral constraint, Rtþ1d
E;m
tþ1rθptþ2ktþ2.
4. At time tþ2, the entrepreneur is old, she repays the debt, produces output and consumes the rest.
Therefore, the budget constraints for young, middle aged and old entrepreneurs, respectively, are
EþdE;yt ZptkE;mtþ1; ð1Þ
dE;mtþ1þFðkE;mtþ1Þþptþ1kE;mtþ1ZRtdE;yt þptþ1kE;otþ2; ð2Þ
FðkE;otþ2Þþptþ2kE;otþ2ZRtþ1dE;mtþ1þcE;otþ2; ð3Þ
and the collateral constraints for young and middle aged entrepreneurs, respectively, are
Rtd
E;y
t rθptþ1ktþ1; ð4Þ
Rtþ1d
E;m
tþ1rθptþ2ktþ2: ð5Þ
I assume, for simplicity, that the production function is linear. In particular, I assume that FðkÞ ¼ αk, where α40 is the
productivity. I also assume that capital does not depreciate.9
Savers live two periods. Each generation consists of a mass of one. Only young savers receive an endowment W. Both the
endowment and population of savers are constant.
I assume that the life time utility of a saver born at time t is
Ut ¼ ln cItþβ ln cItþ1;
where I denotes saver.
The timing of events of a saver born at time t is as follows.
1. At time t, the saver is born, she receives an endowment W and she chooses how much to save dIt .
2. At time tþ1, the saver is old, she consumes the returns on her savings, RtdIt , and she dies.
Therefore, the budget constraints of young and old savers can be written as
WþdItZcIt ;
0ZcItþ1þRtdIt :
Capital market equilibrium requires that the demand of capital of entrepreneurs equals the supply of capital. I assume,
without loss of generality, that the supply of capital Kt
S
is ﬁxed,10
KSt ¼ K 8 t:
The only ﬁnancial asset in this economy are the collateralized bonds, which are in zero net supply. Therefore, in equi
librium, savings of savers must equal borrowings of entrepreneurs.8 This borrowing constraint is the same as in Monacelli (2009). It is also similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) with the difference that they assume
θ 1.
9 I assume, without loss of generality, that there is no rental market. There is limited enforcement in my economy. In this context, entrepreneurs are
able to borrow because they own the capital. Even with their own capital, they can only borrow a fraction θ of the value of their capital. If they were only
renting capital, the limited enforcement problemwould be more severe (entrepreneurs need to have “skin in the game”). Thus, entrepreneurs would prefer
to purchase capital. Savers would not want to rent capital because they do not have the production technology to use it.
10 In the Appendix A discuss in more detail how the quantitative results of the model depend on the elasticity of capital supply.
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2.2. Bubbleless equilibrium
In this section I solve the steady state bubbleless equilibrium of the model.
Deﬁnition. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices of capital pt, interest rate Rt, choices of capital kt , debt d
i
t ,
consumption ct
i
for iA I; Ef g for all t40, given initial endowments of savers and entrepreneurs and exogenous supply of
capital, such that entrepreneurs maximize their utility given their income, savers maximize their utility given their income
and all markets clear.
The problem of entrepreneurs is
max
dE yt ;d
E;m
t þ 1 ;k
E;m
t þ 1 ;k
E;o
tþ 2 ;c
E;o
t þ 2
  Ut ¼ uðcE;otþ2Þ
s:t: ð1Þ to ð5Þ:
I solve the equilibrium by assuming that the collateral constraint is binding and then I check that this is the optimal
choice.11 Therefore, the optimal choices of entrepreneurs are
kE;mtþ1 ¼
E
pt
θ
Rt
ptþ1
; dE;yt ¼
θptþ1
Rtpt θptþ1
E;
kE;otþ2 ¼
ðαþptþ1ÞkE;mtþ1 RtdE;yt
ptþ1
θ
Rt
ptþ2
; dE;mtþ1 ¼
θ
Rt
ptþ1k
E;o
tþ2;
cE;otþ2 ¼ αk
E;o
tþ2þð1 θÞptþ2kE;otþ2:
The ﬁrst line is the investment and borrowing choices of young entrepreneurs. Their only income is the endowment E
and they use it to invest. The key equation is the investment of middle aged entrepreneurs kE;otþ2. Note that this equation is
almost identical to the investment of farmers in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The only difference is that θo1. However, it is
still the case that if they are leveraged (i.e., αkE;mtþ1oRtd
E;y
t ), a proportional increase in the present and future price of capital
raises investment. Finally, consumption of old entrepreneurs depends on the productivity of their technology (α) and the
value of their capital.
Next, I turn to the problem of savers. A saver born at time t solves the following program
max
cIt ;c
I
t þ 1
  Ut ¼ ln cItþβ ln cItþ1
s:t: cItþ
cItþ1
Rt
¼W :
Therefore, the optimal choices of the saver are given by
cIt ¼
1
1þβW ; d
I
t ¼
β
1þβW ;
cItþ1 ¼
Rtβ
1þβW :
Young savers save a constant fraction of their endowment and they will consume the return of their savings the next
period.
Having solved the problems of entrepreneurs and savers, I can now ﬁnd the steady state equilibrium. There are three
markets in this economy. By Walras' Law I can focus on only two of them. I choose the capital and bond markets. For ease of
notation, I drop the subindex t to denote steady state values (e.g., the borrowing of savers in the steady state is dI).
The capital market clears when the supply of capital equals the demand of capital of entrepreneurs. Therefore, the capital
market clearing condition is
KmðR;θÞþKoðR;θÞ ¼ K :
Since there is a zero net supply of bonds, the aggregate borrowing demand must be zero. Thus, the bond market clearing
condition can be written as
dE;yþdE;mþdI ¼ 0:11 Investment is better than saving when pt þ 1 þαpt ZRt . Given assumption A1 (below), in the steady-state we will have Rr1. Thus, since we have
assumed that α40, it follows that investment is always better and the collateral constraint will bind in equilibrium.
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Using the two market clearing conditions, it follows that the unique equilibrium interest rate RNB ¼ rðθ;β;W ; E;K Þ is
implicitly deﬁned by12
RNB
θ
β
1þβ
W
K
¼Φ RNB;θ;K
E
!
:
It is easy to check that the equilibrium interest rate is increasing with θ, E and K and decreasing with W and β. The
reason is that an increase in either the endowment of savers (W) or their patience (β) directly increases the demand of
bonds, which reduces the interest rate. Analogously, an increase in either how much can be collateralized (θ) or the
endowment of entrepreneurs (E) directly increases howmuch entrepreneurs can borrow. The supply of bonds is equal to the
borrowings of entrepreneurs, therefore, the interest rate raises. The more subtle comparative statics is on K . As the supply of
capital increases, the price of capital falls, which increases how much entrepreneurs can borrow.
Once I have found the interest rate, all the other equilibrium outcomes can be derived.
p¼ R
NB
θ
β
1þβ
W
K
;
kE;m ¼ E
1
θ
RNB
 
pNB
; kE;o ¼ αþð1 θÞp
NB
1
θ
RNB
 
pNB
kE;m;
cE ¼ αþð1 θÞpNB kE;o; cI ¼ RNBβ
1þβW :
To guarantee that this is a solution and to allow the possibility of rational bubbles to emerge in equilibrium, I make the
next assumption on the pledgeable fraction of capital θ.
Assumption A1:
θoθ where 1
θ
β
1þβ
W
K
¼Φ 1;θ;K
E
!
:
This assumption implies that there is a shortage of assets in equilibrium. The intuition behind this assumption is that the
problem of limited enforcement is severe enough to make lenders ask a fraction higher than 1 θ of capital as collateral.
Given assumption A1, RNBo1 and the collateral constraint is binding. I have a negative real interest rate because there is
no growth in the economy. In this type of economies it is not unusual to have a negative real interest rate (see, for example,
Kocherlakota, 2009).
Note also that θ depends on W. It easy to check that θ increases with the endowment of savers W. It means that for a
given θ, the larger is the endowment of savers, the more likely is that A1 holds. Therefore, with a constant θ4θ, if the
economy experiences a capital inﬂow (an increase in W), A1 may hold. In this paper I abstract from the reasons behind A1
and I consider a closed economy.133. Equilibrium with bubbles
In this section I show that if assumption A1 holds, rational bubbles can appear in equilibrium. In particular, Section 3.1
computes the steady state equilibrium with an Outside Bubble and Section 3.2 with an Inside Bubble.
3.1. Outside bubble
In this subsection I ﬁnd the steady state equilibrium with an Outside Bubble. I deﬁne an Outside Bubble as savers
engaging in a Ponzi game. Young savers buy a useless and costless asset and they sell it when they are old to the next
generation of savers.
As shown in Tirole (1985), rational bubbles are possible if the next two conditions are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst condition is the
arbitrage condition. Savers must (weakly) prefer investing in the bubble to buying the bond (i.e., Btþ1=BtZRt) . The second
condition is that there must be a shortage of assets. That is, the supply of assets must be smaller than the demand of assets,
at this interest rate, dE;yðRtÞþdE;mðRtÞo dIðRtÞ.12 The capital market clearing condition can be written as RR θ
E
p
h i
1þ RR θ
αþð1 θÞp
p
h i
K , which deﬁnes a relationship between price of capital and
interest rate, p Φ R;θ; KE
 	
. It is easy to check that Φð:Þ is decreasing with R. Similarly, the bond market clearing condition can be written as p Rθ
β
1þβ
W
K
,
which is increasing with R. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium interest rate RNB .
13 See, for example, Caballero et al. (2006), or Basco (2014), for a model in which capital inﬂows are conducive to shortage of assets.
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Fig. 4. Bond market in the steady-state with Outside Bubble.Since both the endowment of savers and population are constant, the return on the bubble in the steady state is one.
Thus, an Outside Bubble is possible in the steady state when,
dE;yðR¼ 1ÞþdE;mðR¼ 1ÞþdIðR¼ 1ÞþB¼ 0
and B40:
I solve the equilibrium assuming that these two conditions are satisﬁed and then I check that, indeed, B40.
The capital market clearing condition in steady state can be written as
Kmð1;θÞþKoð1;θÞ ¼ K :
The bond market clearing condition in steady state is
dE;yðR¼ 1ÞþdE;mðR¼ 1ÞþdIðR¼ 1ÞþB¼ 0:
Plugging the optimal choices of entrepreneurs and savers into the market clearing conditions, we ﬁnd that
B¼ βð1 θÞW ð1þβÞθψEð1þβÞð1 θÞ 40;
p¼ 1
1 θ
E
K
ψ ;
where ψ ¼ 1þ 1þαKE
h i1=2
.
The intuition for the existence of the Outside Bubble can be seen in Fig. 4. This ﬁgure represents the steady state bond
market. The vertical line is the demand of assets. The downward slopping line is the supply of assets. Given assumption A1,
the equilibrium interest rate without bubbles is below one. Therefore, when the interest rate is one the supply of assets is
lower than the demand of assets and a bubble may appear. In other words, the size of the bubble is the horizontal distance
between the demand of funds (savings of savers) dI and the supply of funds (borrowings of entrepreneurs) dE;yþdE;m
when R¼1.
Finally, the equilibrium capital and consumption allocations are
Km ¼ 1
ψ
K ; Ko ¼ψ 1
ψ
K ;
Co ¼ψ 1
ψ
αKþψE :
3.2. Inside bubble
In this subsection I compute the steady state equilibriumwhen there is an Inside Bubble. When there is an Inside Bubble,
I assume that savers, instead of coordinating among themselves, decide to purchase capital. Since savers do not have any
production technology, they just store the capital and sell it when they are old.
The return on investing on capital is the price appreciation. Therefore, the two conditions under which an Inside Bubble
can appear are the same as for an Outside Bubble.
dE;yðR¼ 1ÞþdE;mðR¼ 1ÞþdIðR¼ 1ÞþB¼ 0
and B40:8
I proceed in the same manner as in Subsection 3.1. I claim that the bubble exists and then I check that it is indeed the
case. Note that the bond market clearing condition is the same as with the Outside Bubble,
dE;yðR¼ 1ÞþdE;mðR¼ 1ÞþdIðR¼ 1ÞþB¼ 0:
However, the capital market clearing condition is different. When there is an Inside Bubble, savers use a fraction of their
savings (the bubble) to purchase capital. That is, savers demand Bp units of capital. Thus, the market clearing condition
becomes
Km 1;θ

 þKo 1;θ
 þB
p
¼ K :
By plugging the optimal choices of entrepreneurs and savers into the market clearing conditions, we ﬁnd that14
p¼ϕ θ;K
E
;
W
E
!
;
B¼ β
1þβW θp K
mð1;θÞþKoð1;θÞ ;
Km ¼ Eð1 θÞp; K
o ¼ αþð1 θÞpð1 θÞp K
m:
It is easy to check that the size of the bubble is also positive. However, I defer this discussion until the next section, where
I compare the two bubbles.
Discussion of the model: Before deriving the main results of the paper, I discuss some features and assumptions of
the model.
First, the source of rational bubbles in the model is the ﬁnancial market imperfection. Entrepreneurs are ﬁnancially
constrained, which limits how much they can borrow and it constrains the supply of assets. This market incompleteness
creates the shortage of assets that makes bubbles possible. Thus, to eliminate the emergence of bubbles or reduce their size,
the best policy option would be to improve ﬁnancial markets (i.e., increase θ). This is exempliﬁed by the need to make
assumption A1. Indeed, if θ were higher than θ, bubbles would not be possible in equilibrium.
Given this shortage of assets, savers need to look for alternative ways to transfer wealth to the future. This problem was
highlighted in the seminal paper of Samuelson (1958). My Outside Bubble is analogous to his solution to this problem
(money). That is, the Outside Bubble is a costless asset that savers can use to transfer wealth to the next period. Since its
gross return is one (there is no population nor endowment growth), it will be purchased in equilibrium only when there is a
shortage of assets that drives the interest rate below one. The second option, Inside Bubble, is that savers purchase capital
(houses). Savers do not derive utility from owning capital. The only reason why savers purchase capital is to transfer wealth
to the next period. Young savers buy this asset only to sell it when they will be old.
Finally, given the above reasoning, it is straightforward to see that adding a renting optionwould not help savers. In other
words, since savers only purchase capital (houses) for the capital gains, they would not want to rent it. Thus, to incorporate
renting into the model, I would need to assume that savers have to live in a house. In the Appendix, I brieﬂy sketch how the
shortage of assets could be exacerbated in this case.4. Switching bubbles: from Outside to Inside Bubbles
In this section, I study the effects of switching from an Outside Bubble to an Inside Bubble.
Following with the motivation of the paper, it could be argued that the U.S. was in a steady state with a Dot Com Bubble
in the late 1990s. However, investors realized in 2000 that they would not be able to sell the stocks of these Dot Com
companies at a higher price. Thus, they decided to buy houses instead (Housing Bubble). That is, there was a shortage of
assets in the economy that needed to be ﬁlled and the Dot Com Bubble was replaced by the Housing Bubble.15
To translate this narrative into the model, I proceed as follows. I assume that the economy starts in the steady state
equilibriumwith an Outside Bubble. In this equilibrium, young savers are happy to buy the costless asset because they think
that they will be able to sell it to the next generation of young savers in the next period. In other words, savers coordinate to
the Outside Bubble equilibrium.
However, all of the sudden, there is an unexpected “sentiment” shock. Young savers become pessimistic and decide not
to buy the costless asset.16 Instead of buying the costless asset, they coordinate to purchase capital. Given that without
bubbles the interest rate is below one (assumption A1), purchasing capital is better than purchasing bonds (Inside Bubble).14 It can be shown that p ϕ θ; KE ;
W
E
 	
1 θð Þbþ ð1 θÞ2b2 þ4 1 θð ÞαKE
 1=2
2 1 θð ÞKE
where b 2þ β1þβWE .
15 The idea that the bust of the Dot-Com Bubble was the origin of the Housing Bubble was present in both the economic media (e.g, Krugman, 2005)
and policy circles (e.g, Caballero, 2006).
16 This type of sunspot equilibria is common in the rational bubbles literature (see, for example, Martin and Ventura, 2012).
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Fig. 5. Switching bubbles: From Outside to Inside Bubbles. Notes: In this exercise I assume that the price of capital directly adjusts to new steady-state.Thus, the Outside Bubble gets replaced by the Inside Bubble.17 It would be very interesting to endogenize this switch,
instead of assuming “sentiment” shocks. However, this is beyond the scope of this paper and I leave it for future research.
I make two additional assumptions to characterize the effects of the switch. The ﬁrst assumption is that prices are fully
ﬂexible. It implies that the price of capital immediately adjusts to the new steady state. The second plausible assumption is
that entrepreneurs are leveraged. It means that the value of production is lower than the debt (i.e., αKmoDE;y).18
We are now ready to analyze how the economy is affected by switching from an Outside to an Inside Bubble.
4.1. Investment
In this subsection I study the effect of the switch on the productive investment. Panel a of Fig. 5 shows that prices
immediately adjust to the new steady state. Prices with an Inside Bubble are higher than those with an Outside Bubble
because now there is an extra demand for capital (savers purchase capital as a store of value).
Panel b represents the evolution of investment of young entrepreneurs,
Km ¼ Eð1 θÞp: ð6Þ
Note that it falls at impact to the new steady state level. The reason is that young entrepreneurs do not have capital. Thus, all
the effects are through the user cost of capital: investment falls because prices are higher.
Panel c represents the evolution of the investment of middle aged entrepreneurs,
Ko ¼ ðαþpÞK
m Dy
ð1 θÞp : ð7Þ
It increases at impact and then it converges to the new lower steady state. At impact, the amount of capital that they
purchased when they were young, Km, and the debt, Dy, are ﬁxed. Thus, higher prices raise investment because the increase in
net worth (the numerator) is higher than the increase in the user cost of capital (denominator). This result is due to the
assumption that entrepreneurs are leveraged (i.e., αKmoDE;y). Nonetheless, investment is lower in the new steady state. The17 Note that there exists an indeterminacy of different types of bubbles. Since both bubbles have the same return, the saver is indifferent between the
two and the two could coexist. However, I assume, consistent with the data, that ﬁrst there was the Outside Bubble and then the Inside Bubble. For a
further discussion on indeterminacy of bubbles, see, for example, the equilibrium with “bubble substitution” in Tirole (1985) or Example 4.1 in Santos and
Woodford (1997).
18 Assumption A1 does not guarantee that the leverage of entrepreneurs is positive in the steady-state.
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Fig. 6. Size of the bubble: Outside and Inside Bubbles.reason is that there are two effects. On the one hand, a higher price of capital raises the net worth of entrepreneurs. On the other
hand, a higher price reduces the investment that the entrepreneur made when she was young. The second effect dominates.
Therefore, the investment of middle aged entrepreneurs is lower with an Inside Bubble.19 Note that if I did not assume that the
net worth of entrepreneurs is negative, the only difference would be that, at impact, investment would also fall.
To summarize, after switching from the Outside to the Inside Bubble, the capital used by entrepreneurs (both middle
aged and old) declines. In the Appendix I show that this result does not depend on the capital supply elasticity. Section 4.3
provides suggestive evidence consistent with this prediction.
4.2. Debt and size of the bubble
This section describes the effect on the debt of entrepreneurs and the size of the bubble.
Debt: Panel d of Fig. 5 represents the debt of young Dy and middle aged entrepreneurs Dm. Borrowing of entrepreneurs is
limited by the collateral constraint, therefore, it is proportional to the value of their future capital. Note that the borrowing
of young entrepreneurs is the same with the two types of bubbles. From Eq. (6), it is clear that the future income of young
entrepreneurs, pKm, is constant.
The amount that middle aged entrepreneurs borrow increases at impact. However, in the steady state, the borrowing with
the Inside Bubble is lower than that with the Outside Bubble. From Eq. (7), we can see that the pledgeable capital of middle aged
entrepreneurs has two components. The value of capital purchased when young pKm and the leverage ðαKm DyÞ. At impact, Km
and Dy are constant. Thus, an increase in the price raises the value of capital purchased when young, which increases borrowing.
Note that, in contrast to the real investment Ko, this result does not depend on the sign of the second component (leverage). In
the new steady state, the debt of middle aged entrepreneurs is lower. The intuition is that the value of capital purchased when
young is constant but the leverage decreases (αKm is lower with the Inside Bubble, while Dy is the same)
Therefore, the borrowing of entrepreneurs falls with the Inside Bubble. This is consistent with Fig. 3. Next section
provides additional evidence consistent with this prediction.
Size of the bubble: Panel e of Fig. 5 represents the change in the size of the bubble. The size of the bubble is the difference
between the demand and the supply of bonds. The demand of bonds (savings) is a fraction of the endowment of savers, which is
constant. The supply of bonds is the total debt of entrepreneurs. Given that the demand of bonds does not change when the
economy switches between bubbles, the change in the size of the bubble is the mirror image of the change in the debt of middle
aged entrepreneurs. Therefore, the size of the bubble drops at impact (it looks like a bust instead of a switch between bubbles).
However, in the new steady state, the bubble is larger than in the old steady state. The next proposition shows this last result.
Proposition 1. The Inside Bubble is larger than the Outside Bubble.
Proof. To prove this result note that the size of bubble can be written as Bj ¼ β1þβW θEξ pj

 
for j¼ In;Outf g, where
ξ pj

 ¼ pj Km;jð1;θÞþKo;jð1;θÞh i¼ 2ð1θÞpjþαð1θÞ2pj and In and Out stand for Inside and Outside Bubble, respectively. It is immediate
to show that ξ0ðpjÞo0. Therefore, since pIn4pOut , we have that BIn4BOut . □
The intuition for this result can be seen in Fig. 6. It represents the steady state bond market for the two bubbles. The
vertical line is the demand of bonds, which is the fraction of the endowment that savers save. The downward sloping lines,
the supply of bonds, are the borrowing choices of entrepreneurs. As we have seen above, the debt of middle aged19 Capital of old-aged entrepreneurs can be written as ko pð Þ αþð1 θÞpð1 θÞp k
m pð Þ. Taking derivative of koðpÞ with respect to p and noting that ∂∂pk
m pð Þo0, it
follows that koðpÞ decreases with the price of capital.
11
0
10
20
30
40
P
er
ce
nt
-40000 -20000 0 20000
Liabilities
Housing Bubble Dot-Com Bubble
Fig. 7. Distribution of liabilities in all sectors. Notes: This ﬁgure represents the distribution of differences of liabilities with respect to trend in all sectors in
the two bubble episodes. It is analogous to the lines in Fig. 3 but with all 2-digit NAICS.entrepreneurs depends negatively on the price of capital. When there is an Inside Bubble, savers purchase capital, which
increases the price of capital and reduces the borrowings of middle aged entrepreneurs. Therefore, the supply of bonds falls
(shifts to the left). Since when there is a bubble, the interest rate is equal to one, the difference between the demand and the
supply of assets (the bubble) is higher with an Inside Bubble.
Note from the proof that only when α¼ 0, the two bubbles have the same size. The reason is that, in this case, debt is
independent of the price of capital. Moreover, this result does not depend on the zero supply elasticity of capital. If I allowed
for a positive supply elasticity, the rise in prices would be lower but it would still be the case that the Inside Bubble is larger
than the Outside Bubble (see the Appendix for a more detailed discussion).
4.3. Suggestive evidence
The main prediction of the model is that non residential investment declines when the economy switches from the Outside
to the Inside Bubble. The mechanism through which this switch translates into a fall in non residential investment is the
decline in the borrowing of entrepreneurs. This section provides suggestive evidence consistent with these predictions.
4.3.1. Borrowing of entrepreneurs
In the model, as the economy switches from the Outside to the Inside Bubble, the total borrowing of entrepreneurs
declines. As a ﬁrst piece of evidence, in the Introduction, Fig. 3 plotted the evolution of (detrended) liabilities for the
manufacturing sector. This ﬁgure showed that (detrended) liabilities declined during the Housing Bubble.
Fig. 7 reports the change in the distribution of (detrended) liabilities in all sectors in the United States. As it can be seen, the
distribution of liabilities shifted to the left during the Housing Bubble. One concern is that to compute the trend I also use
information during the Housing Bubble, which could bias my results. To address this concern, I repeat the analysis by computing
the trend before 2002 and also before 2001 (for excluding the recession too). For themanufacturing sector, the qualitative results do
not change. When all sectors are considered, the median of the distribution is still lower with the housing bubble, but the mean is
positive. It means that there were a few sectors with a large positive difference in (detrended) liabilities, which drive the mean. To
summarize, manufacturing ﬁrms and the median sector experienced a relative decline in borrowing during the Housing Bubble.
A formal empirical analysis of the effect of the housing bubble on the credit supply is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, there is an empirical paper who studies these effects for the U.S.. Chakraborty et al. (2014) show that during the
housing bubble, banks in more booming areas decreased commercial lending. Note that this decline in commercial lending
is consistent with the prediction of model. In addition, they show that ﬁrms borrowing from these banks invested less. This
is also consistent with the prediction of the model.
4.3.2. Non residential investment
In this section I provide more suggestive evidence that during the Housing Bubble, residential investment increased,
whereas non residential investment declined. Fig. 2, in the introduction, showed that the increase in residential investment
during the Housing Bubble coincided with a decline in non residential investment in the United States.
In order to complement this evidence, Fig. 8 represents the share of investment in housing and house prices. The share of
housing in total investment was roughly constant around 20 percent during the years of the Dot Com Bubble. At the onset of
the Housing Bubble, the share sharply increased and it reached 28.7 percent in 2005. After the burst of the Housing Bubble,
the share of housing collapsed. One remarkable fact of this ﬁgure is that during the Dot Com Bubble house prices also
increased. However, it was not until the onset of the Housing Bubble that the rise in house prices translated into an increase
in the housing share.12
Table 1
Housing Bubble and non-residential investment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share residential (over GFCF) Non-residential investment
House price 0.033 0.026 4.75 4.69
(0.005) (0.006) (0.498) (0.660)
HPnHousing Bubble 0.019 1.94
(0.005) (0.411)
HPnDot-Com Bubble 0.003 2.02
(0.009) (0.764)
GDP 1.20 1.10 1.34 1.37
(0.267) (0.233) (0.09) (0.09)
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y
No. observations 126 126 126 126
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Share of residential (over GFCF) is the share of dwellings of gross ﬁxed capital formation. Non-residential
investment is (1-share of dwellings)*GFCF, detrended. These data come from the OECD database. I have data for house prices from 1995 to 2014. The list of
countries in my sample are Australia, Canada, Spain, Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden and the United States. The housing bubble dummy is computed in a
similar manner to Jordà et al. (2015). The dummy is one if the detrended house price is above 1/2 of the standard deviation of the whole period and prices
fall afterwards. Using this method I ﬁnd that there were housing bubbles in the United States (2003–2007), Spain (2005–2009), Ireland (2003–2007),
Sweden (2014) and the Great Britain (2007). The Dot-Com Bubble is deﬁned for all years and countries as happening between 1996 and 2000. The results
are robust to, for example, exogenously assume that the Housing Bubble in the United States was between 2002 and 2006 or to have an stricter bubble
deﬁnition (e.g., one standard deviation instead of one half). House prices are obtained from the BIS Residential Property Price database.
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Fig. 8. Share of investment in Housing and House Prices. Notes: Share of investment in dwellings is obtained from OECD database. House prices are
obtained from BIS Residential Property Price database. Notes: I assume θ 0:2; β 0:6; E 10;W 20;K 10 and δ 0:6.Fig. 8 hints to a differential effect of house prices on the share of investment in houses depending on the type of bubble.
In order to formally test this implication, I run the following regression for a sample of OECD countries,
Share residentialit ¼ αþβ  Pricesit  HBitþγ  Pricesit  DBitþδiþϵit ð8Þ
where Pricesit is the house price index in country i in time t, HBit is a Housing Bubble dummy, DBit is a Dot Com Bubble
dummy and δi is a set of country ﬁxed effects. Not all countries in the sample had a housing bubble. Thus, I construct the
Housing Bubble dummy in a similar manner to Jordà et al. (2015).20 Since the boom in the stock market was widespread, I
assume that all countries had a stock market bubble between 1996 and 2000. The model predicts that β4γ.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report the coefﬁcients of running this regression. Following with the anecdotal evidence of
Fig. 8, in column 1 I do not use the bubble dummies, but run the share of residential investment on house prices. As it can be
seen, the coefﬁcient of house prices is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In column 2, I run the main speciﬁcation, Eq. (8).
Consistent with the model, the coefﬁcient of house prices is only positive and signiﬁcant for the Housing Bubble episode.
Therefore, this evidence is consistent with the prediction that the share of residential investment increased relatively more
during the Housing Bubble.
In addition, the model also implies that there should be a differential effect of house prices on non residential invest
ment. In order to test this prediction, I run the following regression,
Non residential investmentit ¼ αþβ  Pricesit  HBitþγ  Pricesit  DBitþδiþϵit ð9Þ20 All the details of this regression can be found in the notes of Table 1.
13
Note that this is the same type of regression as Eq. (8). The difference is that the dependent variable is non residential
investment. The model predicts that βoγ. Note that the results in the share of residential investment do not imply the
results on non residential investment. That is, the share of non residential investment could decline with house prices
during the Housing Bubble but this decline could be offset by the increase in total investment.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 report the coefﬁcients of running this regression. In column 3 I do not use the bubble
dummies but only house prices. Note that the coefﬁcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. In column 4, I add the two
bubble dummies. The coefﬁcient on house prices remains negative and signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient is smaller during the
Housing Bubble, but this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant. However, the correlation between house prices and non
residential investment is negative for Housing Bubble episodes ( 0.84) and positive during the Dot Com Bubble (0.27),
which suggests that the negative effect of house prices on non residential investment is larger during Housing Bubble
episodes.
The evidence presented in this section paints a picture consistent with the model. That is, during the Housing Bubble,
manufacturing ﬁrms were able to borrow relatively less, which translated into a relative decline in both the share of non
residential investment and total non residential investment. It would be interesting to formally analyze the effect of dif
ferent bubbles on the borrowing and investment choices of ﬁrms. In order to do that, ﬁrm and bank ﬁrm relationship data
would be required.5. Welfare analysis
This section performs welfare analysis. First, I show that steady state consumption is always higher with an Outside
Bubble. Then, I analyze which bubble a social planner would choose and how this choice depends on the productivity of
entrepreneurs.
5.1. Steady state consumption
This subsection proves that steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble.
Proposition 2. Steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble.
Proof. To prove this result, remember that the interest rate is one with both types of bubbles. Therefore, savers are
indifferent between both bubbles. The consumption of an old entrepreneur is Cj ¼ αþð1 θÞpj Kold;j ¼Γðpj;θÞ for
j¼ In;Outf g, where Γ pj;θ
 ¼ 1þ αð1θÞpjh i2E. It is immediate to show that Γðpj;θÞ is decreasing with pj. Therefore, since
pIn4pOut , it follows that COut4CIn. □
The reason for this result is the following. First, savers are indifferent between the two bubbles because they earn the
same return (R¼1). Then, there are two effects on the consumption of entrepreneurs: price and quantity. On the one hand,
when there is an Inside Bubble, the extra demand for capital raises the price of capital, which increases consumption. On the
other hand, with the Inside Bubble, the competition for capital reduces the amount of capital that entrepreneurs purchase,
which reduces consumption. The second effect always dominates. Thus, steady state consumption is higher with an Outside
Bubble.
5.2. Which bubble a social planner would choose?
In this section I consider that the economy is in a steady state without a bubble and it can switch to a steady state with
either an Inside Bubble or an Outside Bubble. I show that a social planner would choose to switch to an Inside Bubble when
productivity is low. I assume that a social planner cares about the consumption of all future generations. In particular, she
maximizes
Welfaret ¼
X1
t 0
δt uðcE;ot ÞþuðcItÞ
h i
;
where cE;ot is consumption of old entrepreneurs and ct
I
is consumption of savers. As I have said above, since the interest rate
is the same with both bubbles, the consumption of savers does not change. Thus, the social planner only needs to maximize
the consumption of old entrepreneurs.
If at time t the economy coordinates to bubble j¼ In;Outf g, the ﬁrst generation of old entrepreneurs will see that the
price of their capital is pj. The capital and price of capital for the next generations will be the steady state values ðpj;KjÞ.
Therefore, a social planner chooses an Inside Bubble if
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Fig. 9. Welfare analysis: beneﬁt and loss of an Inside Bubble. Notes: Same parameters as Fig. 9. Dashed line with θ 0:1 instead of θ 0:2.By using the consumption functions derived in Section 3, it follows that an Inside Bubble is better if
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The left hand side of Eq. (10) is the relative beneﬁt of having an Inside Bubble and the right hand side is the relative loss.
It cannot be proved analytically that under any conﬁguration of the parameter space one type of bubble is better. To give
an example, consider the parameter δ. When δ¼ 0, the social planner only values the consumption of the ﬁrst generation
and an Inside Bubble is always better. The reason is that the price of capital is higher with the Inside Bubble. On the other
extreme, when δ¼ 1, the social planner only values the consumption of the future generations and an Outside Bubble is
always better. The reason is that steady state consumption is higher with an Outside Bubble (Proposition 2). The com
parative statics I want to emphasize is how changes in the productivity of entrepreneurs affect the choice of the social
planner.
Proposition 3. As productivity decreases, an Inside Bubble becomes relatively better than an Outside Bubble.
This result can be graphically seen in Fig. 9. The darker line is the left hand side of Eq. (10) and the lighter line is the
right hand side of Eq. (10). Note that when productivity is very high (in the ﬁgure, α¼ 3), the two lines are at zero. The
reason is that at this productivity level the size of the bubble is zero. In this ﬁgure the two lines only cross once at α¼ α.
When productivity is below (above) α, the beneﬁt of having an Inside Bubble is larger (lower) than the loss, therefore, the
Inside (Outside) Bubble is better. The intuition for this result is as follows.
The relative beneﬁt of having an Inside Bubble is the price difference pIn pOut , which is decreasing with the productivity.
As productivity increases, the borrowing of entrepreneurs increases, which reduces the size of the bubble. Since the size of
the bubble is small, the relative increase in the price of capital and, thus, relative beneﬁt of the Inside Bubble, is smaller. This
can also be seen in the proof of Proposition 1.
The relative loss of having an Inside Bubble is the consumption difference in the steady state, which has an inverse U
shape. When productivity (α) is very low, the effect of the price of capital on the borrowing of middle aged entrepreneurs is
small. Thus, the consumption of old entrepreneurs is very similar with both bubbles. Even though the bubble is very large
pOut⪡pIn, the value of investment is very similar, pOutKOutCpInKIn. When productivity is very large, the two bubbles are very
small and the negative effects of the Inside Bubble are also small. That is, pOutCpIn and KOutCKIn. For intermediate values of
productivity, the effect of higher prices on the borrowing of middle aged entrepreneurs is high. In this case, investment falls
(KIno KOut) and it is not compensated by higher prices. That is, pOutKOut4pInKIn.
Therefore, an Inside Bubble is better when productivity is low. When productivity is low, the bubble is large, which
means that the gain of the ﬁrst generation of old entrepreneurs is large. Moreover, the loss of next generations is small
because the fall in capital is offset by the increase in its price. In other words, an Inside Bubble is inefﬁcient because some
capital, instead of being used to produce output, it is purchased for savers as a store of value. This inefﬁciency is higher, the
more productive the entrepreneurs are. Therefore, the more productive an economy is, the worse it is to have an Inside
Bubble.
5.2.1. Complementarity of productivity and ﬁnancial institutions
In this section I ask in which countries a social planner is more likely to choose one type of bubble over another.
In order to answer this question I interpret the tightness of the collateral constraint, θ, as an index of the quality of
ﬁnancial institutions. The idea is that in more ﬁnancially developed countries, the problem of limited enforcement is less
severe and, thus, lenders ask borrowers a lower fraction of capital as collateral.15
Fig. 11. Inside Bubbles are better in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
Fig. 10. Welfare: effect of ﬁnancial development.Proposition 4. An Inside Bubble is better in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
Fig. 10 represents how the relative beneﬁt and loss of having an Inside Bubble is affected by the level of ﬁnancial
institutions (θ). The dotted line represents an economy with a lower level of ﬁnancial development. Note that the Inside
Bubble would be chosen for a wider range of productivity values in the economy with a lower level of ﬁnancial
development.
The intuition for this result follows from Propositions 1 and 3. Proposition 1 implies that countries with less ﬁnancially
developed institutions (low θ ) have larger bubbles. Therefore, given productivity, the size of an Inside Bubble is larger in less
ﬁnancially developed countries. Then, Proposition 3 says that Inside Bubbles are relatively better when productivity is low.
This implies that Inside Bubbles are better in less ﬁnancially developed countries when productivity is low. Thus, the
productivity level α that equals the welfare of both bubbles decreases with θ.21 That is, the range of productivity levels (α)
in which an Inside Bubble is better than an Outside Bubble ð0;αÞ is larger in less ﬁnancially developed countries. This can be
seen in Fig. 11. In this sense, an Inside Bubble is better in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
Therefore, this simple model could rationalize why real estate bubbles tend to appear more often in ﬁnancially under
developed countries. Moreover, according to the model, this type of bubble would be a good solution to their shortage of
assets.226. Concluding remarks
Booms and busts of asset prices have been with us from, at least, the Dutch Tulip Mania in 1636 to the housing bubbles in
different developed economies in the late 2000s (Kindleberger, 1978). Given that these episodes have been recurrent
throughout history, it seems important to understand the effects of different asset price bubbles.21 It is easy to prove that, in the neighborhood of α 0, the net gain of having an Inside instead of an Outside Bubble is larger in the country with less
ﬁnancially developed institutions. The reason is that whereas the consumption of next generations is not affected by the size of the bubble, the price
increase in the ﬁrst generation does depend on the size of the bubble. Then, by a continuity argument, we can say that the α that equals the relative
beneﬁt and loss of an Inside Bubble decreases with θ.
22 See, for example, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) for a discussion on real estate bubbles in emerging economies.
16
In this paper I have focused on one important difference among asset price bubbles: the type of asset in which the bubble
is attached. I developed a framework to understand the differential effect of Inside Bubbles (the asset is an input of pro
duction, also used by entrepreneurs as collateral) and Outside Bubbles (the asset is costless and it is not used as an input). I
view these two bubbles as stylized representations of the Housing and the Dot Com Bubbles, respectively.
I have shown that when the economy switches from an Outside to an Inside Bubble, the investment and debt of
entrepreneurs decline, which is consistent with the data. Rational bubbles emerge in the model because there is a shortage
of assets. In this situation, savers have incentives to purchase “useless” assets as a store of value (Outside Bubble). However,
when savers think that they will not be able to sell this asset, they prefer to purchase capital as a store of value (Inside
Bubble). By purchasing capital, savers affect the production side of the economy. In particular, this increase in the demand of
capital hurts entrepreneurs, which can borrow and invest less.
Finally, I also showed that the two bubbles have different effects on welfare. In particular, a social planner prefers an
Inside Bubble when the productivity of entrepreneurs is low. The reason is that the Inside Bubble distorts the economy
because some resources, instead of being used by entrepreneurs, are being held by savers only as a store of value. When
entrepreneurs are very low productive, the capital gain of the ﬁrst generation of old entrepreneurs offsets the distortion.
To conclude, in a world with a shortage of assets, new bubbles are likely to emerge in the future. This paper has provided
a framework to analyze the effects of two different bubbles. Given that these bubbles have different effects on welfare, it
may be interesting to extend the model and study how governments (or central banks) could help investors to select the
“right” bubble. Another potential avenue for future research would be to empirically analyze the effect of asset price bubbles
on the credit supply and the allocation of inputs within industries.Acknowledgments
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0431.Appendix A. Elastic capital supply
In the baseline model I have considered the case in which the supply of capital was inelastic. As I discussed in the main
text, the main results of the paper are independent of the capital supply elasticity. However, it seems interesting to analyze
how the magnitude of the effects depend on the capital supply elasticity. In this appendix I consider that the supply of
capital Kt
S
is given by
KSt ¼ Kpεt ;
where εZ0 is the price elasticity of supply. Note that the case studied in the baseline model corresponds to ε¼ 0.
Table 1 reports the comparative statics on changing the capital supply elasticity. To be precise, each number is the
percentual change of being in the steady state with an Inside Bubble with respect to an Outside Bubble.
Price of capital: The ﬁrst row of Table A1 shows the relative increase in the price of capital. The intuition for this result is
as follows. Remember that I deﬁne an Inside Bubble as savers coordinating in purchasing capital instead of a costless asset
(Outside Bubble). Assume that the size of the two bubbles were the same, it follows that the price of capital would be higher
with an Inside Bubble because the demand of capital has increased. Moreover, the more elastic is the supply of capital, the
lower is the increase in the price. This positive but diminishing increase of the relative price of capital is shown in Table A1.
As I discussed in the main text, the size of the bubble and the price of capital are jointly determined. In particular, the Inside
Bubble is larger, which exacerbates the effect on the relative price of capital.Table A1
Comparative statics on the capital supply elasticity.
Capital supply elasticity
ε 0 ε 0:5 ε 1 ε 2 ε 5 ε 10
Price of capital 9.99 6.53 4.80 3.21 1.59 0.83
Size bubblea 2.29 2.09 1.81 1.61 1.21 0.52
Stock of capital 0 3.21 4.80 6.52 8.20 8.59
Capital used by entrepreneurs 9.06 6.13 4.68 3.10 1.56 1.21
Notes: All numbers represent percentual changes of the variable in the steady-state with the Inside Bubble with respect to the steady-state with the
Outside Bubble. I assume θ 0:2; β 0:6; E 10;W 20 and K 10.
a The percentual change is multiplied by 100.
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Size of the bubble: In the second row of Table A1 I show how the relative increase in the size of the bubble depends on the
capital supply elasticity. As Proposition 1 states, an Inside Bubble is always larger than an Outside Bubble. From the proof of
Proposition 1, it follows that the Inside Bubble is larger as long as the price of capital is higher with an Inside Bubble. When
the price of capital increases, the supply of assets in the economy falls, which increases the shortage of assets that the
bubble needs to ﬁll. Note that the increase in the relative size of the bubble falls with the elasticity of capital supply. The
reason is that the increase in price, as shown in the ﬁrst row, falls with the capital supply elasticity.
Stock of capital: In the third row I report how the relative steady state stock of capital changes with the capital supply
elasticity. As the ﬁrst row showed, the price of capital is larger with the Inside Bubble. Therefore, if the supply of capital is
elastic, this higher price translates into an increase in the relative stock of capital in the steady state. In addition, the more
elastic is the supply of capital, the larger is the increase in the stock of capital.
Capital used by entrepreneurs: In the last row of Table A1 I compute the change in the total capital used by entrepreneurs
in the steady state. We have seen that the total stock of capital is higher with an Inside Bubble because prices are higher.
However, the capital used by entrepreneurs is always lower in the steady state with an Inside Bubble. The change in capital
used by entrepreneurs is B
In
pInþ K
S;In KS;Out
 	
, where KS ¼ Kpε. There are two effects: (i) negative competition effect: savers
demand capital in the Inside Bubble, which reduces the amount available to entrepreneurs and (ii) positive supply effect:
prices are higher with the Inside bubble, which increases the total supply of capital. As Table A1 shows, the ﬁrst effect
always dominates. To see this, notice that when the supply is inelastic, the second effect is not there and the relative loss is
the largest. When the supply is elastic, the second effect is present, which mitigates the loss but it does not eliminate it. In
the limit, when the supply is very elastic, the capital used by entrepreneurs will still be slightly lower with the Inside Bubble.
The reason is that, in this case, the price of capital is the same with the two bubbles, which implies that there will be the
same stock of capital in the two steady states. However, the capital loss of entrepreneurs tends to zero as the capital supply
elasticity increases. In other words, the Inside Bubble becomes an Outside Bubble when the supply of capital is inﬁnite.Appendix B. A bubbleless model with renting
In this appendix I brieﬂy describe how renting could exacerbate the shortage of assets in the economy.
To incorporate renting into the model, I need to assume that savers enjoy utility from living in a house. Otherwise, savers
would not want to rent a house. Moreover, I assume that savers cannot purchase a house, but only rent it. This extreme
assumption allows me to study how the introduction of renting affects the bubbleless equilibrium described in Section 2. In
the baseline model I assumed that agents do not derive utility from capital (housing) because I wanted to emphasize that
they purchase capital (houses) only as a store of value.
The life time utility of a saver born a time t is
Ut ¼ ln cItþβ ln cItþ1þ ln hItþ1
h i
:
The timing of events of a saver born at time t is as follows.
1. At time t, the saver is born, she receives an endowment W and she chooses how much to save dIt .
2. At time tþ1, the saver is old, she derives utility from living in a house and consuming the ﬁnal good; and she dies.
It means that the budget constraints of young and old savers can be written as
WþdItZcIt ;
0ZcItþ1þRtdItþprtþ1htþ1;
where prtþ1 is the rental price of housing.
Finally, for making renting as innocuous as possible, I assume that there is a ﬁxed stock of capital (housing) available for
renting H , which is independent of the capital used by entrepreneurs K . Thus, the problem of entrepreneurs is the same as
in the baseline model.
B.1. EquilibriumDeﬁnition. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices of capital pt, rental price prtþ1, interest rate Rt, choices of
capital kt , debt d
i
t , consumption c
i
t , housing services h
i
tþ1 for i A I; Ef g for all t40, given initial endowments of savers and
entrepreneurs and exogenous supply of capital, such that entrepreneurs maximize their utility given their income, savers
maximize their utility given their income and all markets clear.
It is straightforward to derive the optimal choices of savers,
cIt ¼
1
1þ2βW ; d
I
t ¼
2β
1þ2βW ;18
cItþ1 ¼
βRt
1þ2βW ; htþ1 ¼
1
prtþ1
βRt
1þ2βW :
Note that optimal savings, dIt , are the same as before, except for the fact that we have 2β instead of β. Thus, the introduction
of renting is akin to decreasing the discount rate.
Following the same steps as in the baseline model, the market clearing conditions for capital, renting houses and bond
market, in the steady state, are
KmðR;θÞþKoðR;θÞ ¼ K ;
H¼H ;
dE;yþdE;mþdI ¼ 0:
Solving these equations, it follows that the unique equilibrium interest rate is ~R
NB ¼ rðθ;β;W ; E;K Þ, which is implicitly
deﬁned by23
~R
NB
θ
2β
1þ2β
W
K
¼Φ ~RNB;θ;K
E
!
:
B.1.1. Shortage of assets
Finally, we are interested in whether the introduction of the renting market has made bubbles less likely in equilibrium.
The next proposition shows that the opposite occurs.
Proposition 5. In this model with renting, bubbles are more likely to emerge.
Proof. Note that bubbles are possible when there is a shortage of assets when R¼1. In other words,
dE;yðR¼ 1ÞþdE;mðR¼ 1Þo dIðR¼ 1Þ. The supply of assets (left hand side) is the same as in the baseline model. However, the
demand of assets (right hand side) has increased. Before, the demand was β1þβW , which is smaller than
2β
1þ2βW : Thus, for any
θ, this condition is more likely to hold in this model than in the baseline model. □
To sum up, in this appendix I have shown how the introduction of a renting sector does not solve the shortage of assets.24
The source of bubbles in the model is the ﬁnancial friction that constrains the supply of assets. Therefore, to prevent the
emergence of bubbles, the best solution is to increase the supply of assets. In the model, this could be achieved by intro
ducing policies that increase θ. The housing model in this section was developed to highlight that renting would not solve
the shortage of assets. By doing that, it abstracted from some other features. For example, in practice, both purchasing and
renting coexist in equilibrium. However, this would require, for example, adding heterogeneity in the ﬁnancial capacity of
savers and introduce tax differences between renting and owning. A comprehensive model with house ownership, renting
and investment of ﬁrms is outside the scope of the paper.25References
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